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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
3 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Respondents appeal from the order of the district court 
granting a writ of habeas corpus to the petitioner, Commer Glass, 
who is currently serving a life sentence for first-degree murder. 
The district court held that Glass' trial counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to investigate petitioner's military 
experiences and subsequent history of bizarre behavior, which the 
court concluded would have led counsel to put on a diminished 
capacity defense.  We do not reach that issue.  Instead, because 
petitioner's current habeas claim was procedurally defaulted in 
state court and he does not fall within the "actual innocence" 
exception recently set forth in Schlup v. Delo, ___ U.S. ____, 
115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), we will reverse. 
I. 
 The facts of this case can be found in the published 
opinion of the district court, Glass v. Vaughn, 860 F. Supp. 201 
(E.D. Pa. 1994), and need only be summarized.  Petitioner Glass 
was arrested for the murder of Billie Ann Morris, bound over for 
trial, and retained Attorney Barry Denker to defend him.  Glass 
told both the police and his attorney that he was elsewhere when 
the crime was committed.  Attorney Denker's investigation was 
therefore limited to interviewing petitioner and driving him 
along the route he claimed to have taken on the night of the 
murder.  As we shall see, however, there was much more to the 
story. 
 Petitioner served in the Armed Forces in Vietnam, 
experiencing heavy combat.  He saw many people get killed, 
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including his friends.  On at least two occasions, petitioner 
killed Vietnamese civilians, including a Vietnamese woman who 
allegedly made a threatening gesture to a fellow soldier after a 
sexual encounter.  Petitioner, like many other Vietnam veterans, 
exhibited a variety of behaviors consistent with post-traumatic 
stress disorder ("PTSD").  He had acted violently towards Morris 
even before the murder, and remarked the day before the killing 
that "women do what I say do, if not I kill them." 
 Nonetheless, he never told his attorney about his 
military combat experiences nor about the psychological problems 
that followed.  Indeed, as the district court recognized, "no 
person volunteered any information to Denker and Denker never 
sought any information that would have alerted him to the 
possibility of a psychiatric defense."  Glass, 860 F. Supp. at 
204.  Glass did suggest that Attorney Denker interview Phyllis 
Brown, whom Glass later married, to find out what type of person 
he was, but Denker never interviewed her.  The district court 
found that Mrs. Glass was aware of petitioner's psychological 
problems and would have told Denker about them had she been 
asked.   
 Attorney Denker offered no witnesses at trial and did 
not argue that Glass' diminished capacity from PTSD negated the 
mens rea element of the crime.  Denker instead argued, consistent 
with Glass' statement to the police, that he had an alibi.  The 
jury found Glass guilty of first-degree murder and the court 
sentenced him to life imprisonment.  While in prison, he was 
formally diagnosed as suffering from PTSD. 
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 Glass filed various direct appeals and habeas 
proceedings, including this petition alleging that Attorney 
Denker was ineffective because he failed to investigate and 
pursue a diminished capacity defense.  Glass presented and lost 
on this allegation of error before the state trial court in his 
second postconviction relief petition.  Unfortunately, he did not 
appeal.  Thus, the district court held that petitioner's federal 
habeas claim was both exhausted and procedurally defaulted. 
Without the "actual innocence" exception, the court noted that 
his habeas claim would accordingly be barred.  860 F. Supp. at 
215.  We agree.   
 Glass argues on appeal that, because he raised the 
issue of attorney effectiveness in his first postconviction 
relief petition to the state court (which he did appeal), he has 
properly exhausted the claim currently before this court.  We 
disagree.  In his earlier Post Conviction Hearing Act proceeding, 
Glass argued that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for 
not amending the petition to include the after-discovered 
evidence of PTSD and diminished capacity, even though he had made 
counsel aware of the prison psychologist's diagnosis.  Here, 
Glass asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because he 
failed to investigate a defense based on an undisclosed and 
undiagnosed psychiatric condition.  We cannot say that Glass' 
earlier petition fairly presented this issue to the state 
appellate courts. 
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 The district court, however, held that Glass made out a 
claim of "actual innocence" sufficient to overcome petitioner's 
procedural default.  It opined: 
If the evidence [of PTSD] had been presented 
at trial, there is certainly a fair 
probability that a trier of fact would have 
entertained a reasonable doubt as to his 
guilt of murder in the first degree.  Thus, 
the court concludes that petitioner has 
suffered a fundamental miscarriage of justice 
in that a constitutional violation, 
ineffective assistance of counsel, has 
probably resulted in the conviction of 
petitioner of murder in the first degree when 
he is actually innocent of that crime and 
guilty of murder in the third degree. 
 
Id. at 216.   
 The court ordered an evidentiary hearing to decide 
Glass' habeas petition on its merits.  Petitioner called three 
expert witnesses, two of whom would have been available to 
testify in 1976.  Respondents called one.  All of the witnesses 
testified that there was sufficient information in the mental 
health literature about PTSD that the condition could have been 
diagnosed and presented at Glass' trial.  Moreover, all testified 
that Glass indeed suffered from PTSD at the time of the murder. 
They differed, however, in their opinions whether Glass was in a 
dissociative state that impaired his ability to deliberate or 
premeditate, making him innocent of first-degree murder. 
Petitioner's experts testified that Glass was in such a state; 
respondents' expert was unable to reach a conclusion without 
further testing. 
7 
 The district court found that petitioner was prejudiced 
at trial because counsel failed to pursue a diminished capacity 
defense, and that Attorney Denker unreasonably failed to 
investigate facts indicating the possibility of such a defense. 
It accordingly concluded that trial counsel was ineffective and 
granted the writ.  
II. 
 After the initial briefing in this appeal, the Supreme 
Court handed down its decision in Schlup, which concerned the 
standard for actual innocence claims.  We requested that the 
parties submit supplemental briefs on the question of whether a 
diminished capacity defense--which goes to the degree of guilt 
rather than factual guilt--can state an actual innocence claim in 
light of Schlup.  Schlup itself does not determine that issue. 
 In Schlup, a prison inmate was charged with murdering a 
fellow inmate.  He was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death.  Schlup's habeas petition alleged that his 
counsel was ineffective and that the prosecution had improperly 
withheld evidence from him.  He argued that he was factually 
innocent, but nonetheless was found guilty as a result of these 
constitutional errors.  The Supreme Court established a strict 
test for claims of actual innocence. 
 The . . . habeas petitioner [must] show 
that a constitutional violation has probably 
resulted in the conviction of one who is 
actually innocent.  To establish the 
requisite probability, the petitioner must 
show that it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted him in 
the light of the new evidence.  The 
petitioner thus is required to make a 
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stronger showing than that needed to 
establish prejudice. . . .  
Id. at 867 (emphasis added, citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Court continued: 
 The meaning of actual innocence . . . 
does not merely require a showing that a 
reasonable doubt exists in the light of the 
new evidence, but rather that no reasonable 
juror would have found the defendant guilty. 
It is not the district court's independent 
judgment as to whether reasonable doubt 
exists that the standard addresses; rather 
the standard requires the district court to 
make a probabilistic determination about what 
reasonable, properly instructed jurors would 
do. Thus, a petitioner does not meet the 
threshold requirement unless he persuades the 
district court that, in light of the new 
evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would 
have voted to find him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
Id. at 868. 
 The district court, without the benefit of the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Schlup, and relying on the earlier actual 
innocence cases of Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S. Ct. 
2639 (1986), and Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S. Ct. 
2616 (1986), held that petitioner need only show "a fair 
probability that a trier of fact would have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt of murder in the first degree." 
860 F. Supp. at 216.  It additionally found that Glass "would 
have chosen a diminished capacity defense based on his PTSD if he 
had been fully informed."  Id. at 215.  Because it found a fair 
probability that a trier of fact would have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the court concluded that Glass 
had satisfied the requirements for an actual innocence claim.   
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 The Supreme Court has not decided whether the actual 
innocence test is applicable in a noncapital case when there is 
evidence that defendant committed the crime but argues that he or 
she was responsible for a lesser degree of guilt.  For purposes 
of this opinion, we will assume arguendo that the actual 
innocence test applies.  Nonetheless, we cannot conclude under 
the Schlup test that petitioner has shown that it is more likely 
than not that no rational juror would have voted to convict 
Glass.  Therefore, petitioner's actual innocence claim is doomed 
under the Schlup standard. 
 The gravamen of Glass' psychiatric evidence was that he 
was suffering from PTSD and was in a dissociative state at the 
time of the murder, having no intent to kill and no recollection 
of the murder after it happened.  These psychiatric opinions, 
however, were based entirely on Glass' subjective reporting and 
were arrived at years after the crime.  On the other hand, there 
was evidence that Glass went to the murder scene armed and that 
he had earlier behaved violently towards the victim.  Moreover, 
when arrested, Glass did not give the police the explanation he 
now proffers--that he had no memory of what happened--but relied 
instead on an alibi that he was not even at the scene when the 
killing occurred.  Based on this record we cannot conclude that 
no rational juror would have voted to convict Glass of first-
degree murder. 
 Accordingly, petitioner has not made out a claim of 
actual innocence.  His habeas petition is therefore barred, and 
we will reverse the judgment of the district court. 
